'Bank of evidence' revealed government's threadbare lockdown reasoning

 On Saturday, Boris Johnson announced that England will endure a four week lockdown, joining Northern Ireland and Wales, where so-called ‘circuit breaker’ restrictions are already in place. 

The evidence for these measures is opaque, though the scientific advisory group for emergencies, SAGE, says that hospitals will be overwhelmed by Covid-19 patients by December if no action is taken. When it comes to specific interventions - what should close and why - there is a dearth of material that explains the government’s reasoning.   

In Northern Ireland, though, the province’s department of health recently published an ‘evidence bank’ of documents used to develop its strategy. The devolved executive imposed four weeks of restrictions on the strength of these arguments, shutting down hospitality businesses, closing ‘close contact’ services like hairdressers and beauty salons and preventing separate households from meeting indoors. For schools, the half-term break was extended from one week to a minimum of two.

The reaction from representatives of the business community was scathing. Simon Hamilton is chief executive of Belfast’s Chamber of Commerce, but he previously served as a senior minister in Northern Ireland’s devolved government. During his political career he was a minister for the economy, finance and health. But Mr, Hamilton described the contents of this dodgy dossier as “shocking”, “flimsy” and said they “raise many more questions.” 

According to Northern Ireland’s health minister, Robin Swann, the most prominent piece of evidence in the ‘bank’ comprised “a summary of SAGE evidence which had already been placed in the public domain.” The bulk of the document appeared to be cut and pasted directly from the annex of a national paper that analysed the effectiveness of “non-pharmaceutical options to reduce Covid 19.” 

 

For that reason, it provides an insight into the thinking behind the restrictions, as well as the case for and against each measure, across the whole UK. The flimsiness of the evidence used to support these strategies should therefore concern all of us, and not just the people of Northern Ireland.

In England, Wales, Ulster and parts of Scotland, hospitality businesses are being shut down or placed under heavy restrictions, in an attempt to prevent the virus spreading. However, the document estimates that closing restaurants, bars and cafes completely may result in cutting the R number (the average number of people infected by each person who has tested positive for Covid) by just 0.1-0.2. 

Outdoor eating and drinking will be banned across much of the country, though the impact of this measure is expected to be negligible, according to the paper. And, tellingly, the SAGE report cites ‘multiple anecdotal reports of outbreaks linked to bars in the UK, Europe and the US’ to support the idea that pubs should be shut. 

It’s worrying that, nearly eight months after the start of this crisis, the main group charged with advising the government is working from anecdotal evidence, rather than verifiable facts and figures. You might wonder what exactly it has been doing all this time.

Large gatherings of people outdoors have been prohibited right across the UK since March, but the document notes that this is likely to have a “low impact” on limiting the transmission of the virus. It estimates these interventions will reduce the R number by less than 0.05. The disease “does not persist in well-ventilated outdoor areas for long,” and gatherings of over 50 people are responsible for approximately 2% of Covid cases. 

Likewise, the table suggests that closing ‘close contact personal services’, such as hair-dressers and beauty salons, will have little effect on the R number. Most of us use these services infrequently and businesses have invested heavily in protective equipment.  

The theme is similar for a range of interventions that apply either to the whole UK or to specific parts of the country. The table is the closest thing to an explanation of government thinking that we have, but it is strikingly light on statistics, footnotes or lessons learned from the previous lockdown. 

When the restrictions were relaxed during late spring and summer, did our public health experts not take the opportunity to study in detail how different sectors and practices contributed to the spread of the disease? If that work took place, it’s not in evidence here.

Under ‘implementation issues’, the document notes that a number of interventions ‘improve the consistency’ of the government’s message. And that’s a revealing way of discussing life changing, business-wrecking restrictions.

It seems, that despite so many months living with this disease, many of the government’s interventions are still based on conjecture and best guesses, rather than data. Across the UK, the authorities act to be seen to be doing something and in order to impress upon the public the seriousness with which the disease should be taken.

Sectors of the economy are closed, not because it is demonstrated that they contributed to the spread of Covid-19, or that they cannot continue to operate safely, but in order to change people’s behaviour. If we are allowed to drink at a pub, go to an open air concert or, eat a meal outside a restaurant, then things seem too normal and we stop distancing and washing our hands.

Surely, after all this time, we deserve better? Amid the confusing mishmash of lockdowns, ‘circuit-breakers’, tiers and ‘fire breaks’, can we not have a frank discussion about managing risk, taking personal responsibility and managing this virus without destroying the economic and social life of our country? If the answer is ‘no’, then what exactly is the alternative plan?