Ukraine - pulling at the seams of a fragile state
Lenin stands watch in central Simferopol
It’s been an unsettling experience watching the crisis in
Ukraine and Crimea unfold, over the past few months.
During the summer I visited some of the places which are now
attracting headlines. Independence
Square in Kiev, or ‘Euromaidan’ as it has become known, was full of locals and tourists
enjoying the sunshine; eating ice-cream, posing for sketch artists and
splashing in the fountains. More recently
it resembled the set of a post-apocalyptic sci-fi movie, with barricades, charred
monuments and heaps of smouldering tyres.
Crimea was laid-back in the July heat. Teenagers skateboarded beside the Crimean
Rada in Simferopol, which appeared on TV screens a few weeks ago being
‘stormed’ by armed men. The regional
capital’s airport was busy with tourists heading to and from Russia or
Kiev. It was one of the first strategic
targets to be seized by Russian troops, or local militia, depending upon whose
word you rely, as the emergency deepened.
The Lonely Planet guide book says that Bakhchisaray, in
central Crimea, has a Middle Eastern feel.
This baking hot, dusty town attracted coach trips from the coast during
the summer, with its exotic atmosphere and ‘Khan’s Palace’. This year it has become a magnet for
journalists, who want to write stories about how pro-Russian feeling on the
peninsula threatens Crimean Tatars.
The ‘revolution’ or ‘putsch’ and its aftermath have been
surrounded by propaganda and recriminations.
To add to the confusion, events have unfolded at disorientating
speed. For someone viewing from a
distance, the blanket of fog which covered Kiev at the end of February was a
neat metaphor.
Media coverage has not in general reflected how complicated
and unfortunate the situation in Ukraine has become. A lot of it, especially the comment and
analysis, seems to be informed more by pre-conceived ideas about Russia and the
US, rather than genuine attempts to understand the story from different
perspectives.
Admittedly, it’s hard to write about this crisis. Many articles in newspapers are out of date
by the time they’ve gone to print. Information
from Ukraine is confusing and often contradictory. It is still not clear whether
tensions in the east of the country could spark some sort of military
confrontation.
Most articles in the UK media have plumped for the straightforward
view that Russia, under Vladimir Putin, is an aggressive power, intent upon
expanding toward the boundaries of the former Soviet Union. Others have been a little more nuanced,
suggesting that Putin’s actions during this crisis have been opportunistic,
rather than planned. The most accurate accounts point out that few,
if any, of the key players acted honourably, as tensions increased after
President Yanukovych postponed negotiations for an association agreement with
the EU.
Ukraine has become the
victim of a prolonged geo-political struggle between ‘the West’ and Russia. Go back almost six years on this blog and you can
read about the cultural and historical balancing act which Ukrainians continued
to manage, more or less successfully, and the dangers of upsetting that equilibrium.
Almost no-one now defends Yanukovych’s record in
government. Even his off and on ally, Vladimir
Putin, has acknowledged that he was a greedy, corrupt and weak President. There were ample grounds for Ukrainians to oppose
and protest against his rule. The fact
remains, though, that he was elected fairly. Russia was understandably outraged when the US
and the EU in particular urged protestors, in effect, to overthrow the
government.
In the context of the protests at Euromaidan, it’s worth
remembering that the opposition in Ukraine has continued to refuse to accept the outcome of the 2010 election.
Despite a clean bill of health from the Council of Europe, OSCE and the
CIS, Yulia Tymoshenko disputed the results and her supporters were still camped
on Kiev’s main street, Khreschatyk, during summer 2014, to protest.
Euromaidan harnessed popular disillusionment with the
President, but it was driven, particularly in its latter stages, by an
undercurrent of extreme nationalism and it did not represent accurately the spread
of opinion in Ukraine about drawing closer to the EU. Carl Thomson has written fairly about how Russian
and eastern Ukrainian opinions were shaped by ‘Molotov cocktail throwing,
firearm wielding young men who fought running battles with the police’.
Yankukovych was a rogue, but he was also a democratically
elected President, who was driven from power by the threat of imminent
violence. Even so, the new government in
Kiev had an opportunity to gain acceptance both from ‘the West’ and Russia.
The basis of a compromise included a degree of power sharing
with Russian leaning regions, official status for the Russian language and disarmament
of armed paramilitary groups. Instead,
there were extreme nationalists from Svoboda (or ‘freedom’) in the
administration, attempts to rescind liberal language laws and involvement of
the far right Pravyi Sektor organisation in the police and military.
Russian descriptions of the new government as ‘neo-Nazi’ are
certainly exaggerated. The articulate
young prime minister, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, for instance, is a moderate figure
head, whose fluent English will endear him to western media. However the involvement of an
ultra-nationalist minority has made it much more difficult for Russian speaking
Ukrainians to accept the new administration, and for the Kremlin to recognise
its legitimacy.
It’s hard to see how the new government could have been
constituted without involving extremists.
These far right groups were the ‘shock troops’ who drove the so-called ‘revolution’
as it became more violent. Afterwards, in
an attempt to claim legitimacy from ‘the people’, ministers were presented to
Euromaidan for the crowd’s approval. It
was an odd, almost pre-modern ritual, with echoes of Shakespeare’s Coriolanus. Viewed from Moscow, where the opposition to
Putin comprises a similar coalition of liberals, extreme nationalists and
ultra-leftists, it may have looked like a salutary warning.
With attitudes in eastern and southern parts of Ukraine
hardening, particularly in Crimea, events gained momentum. The initial Euromaidan protests were followed by counter-protests against the government in Kiev. The presence of Russian troops on the
peninsula and the relatively chaotic state of the Ukrainian government gave Russia a
perfect opportunity to act under the pretext of maintaining order.
Putin moved quickly. A groundswell of pro-Kremlin
opinion in Crimea, the reality that pro-Russian militias and Russian troops
were firmly in control and demands from the Crimean authorities for a referendum
on becoming part of Russia, provided a chance to annex the region. It wasn’t right, but it did reflect the will
of a majority of people in Crimea and it occurred against the backdrop of
serious concerns about the legality of the government in Kiev.
The Russian President denies that his troops will now move
into Ukraine proper. Despite the
military build-up at Russia’s western border, it is likely that he is speaking
genuinely, for the moment.
There are frequent pro-Russian protests in cities like
Donetsk, Kharkiv and Lugansk and there have been clashes.. If the
Ukrainian authorities, whose interior ministry troops are reportedly
coordinating their activities with Pravyi Sektor, were to attempt a crack-down
on demonstrators, if there were bloodshed, Putin would still feel extreme
pressure to defend people who are viewed in Russia as ethnic Russians.
The President is certainly not prepared to appear weak. It is quite possible that he will again find
himself reacting to events and making a pragmatic effort to carve out the best
result for Russia, from a volatile set of circumstances.
Rather than talking about a new Cold War and continuing to
tug at the unravelling seams of independent Ukraine, ‘the West’ should now attempt to diffuse tensions. If the
country can remain stable up to and through the Presidential and Rada elections,
its new government can at least claim a credible mandate.
If Ukraine is to remain a viable state within its current
borders, the new administration will have to reach an accommodation with
Russian speakers and reflect its complex make-up in an amended constitution. The future is bleak if the country continues
to be a chessboard for the US, the EU and Russia to play out their
rivalries.
Comments
One excellent article on the issue by Professor Philip Bobbitt appeared in the London Evening Standard of last week. He pointed out a number of realities that have eluded some media commentators. The first is that the West is a difficult position on Ukraine: if we decide to desert its nascent democracy, then its annexation or dismemberment by Russia becomes inevitable; on the other hand, if the UK and US were to move missile sites to Ukraine, thereby making it "scary" to Russia, then we make its dismemberment even more of a foreign policy priority for Russia. The second reality he pointed out was that because of historic Russian interest in the area (especially the Crimea), Ukraine is not the place for the West to see a showdown. We need Russia's input and co-operation in other foreign hot-spots such as Iran and Syria. That said, Russia has violated international law in a major way by moving into the Crimea in the manner which it did.
Bobbitt has suggested that a spell of wide-ranging sanctions would be enough to signal Western displeasure, together with leaving out Russia of the G7 conferences. Whatever happens, together with the upcoming elections, we are looking at a prolonged period of hard negotiations with Russia over the future of Ukraine and its relationship with both Russia and the West. In last week's Guardian, Lord Owen suggested that one solution to the Crimea issue was a "Guantanamo Bay" style answer, whereby Ukraine leases out the Crimea to Russia indefinitely: for me this solution has many merits.